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CASE COMMENT: STATE V. FRAZIER
The double jeopardy clause, although recognizing the govern-
ment's interest in efficient criminal prosecutions, mandates that
the state have only one opportunity to convict a defendant.' How-
ever, there is a well-established principle that the clause does not
"preclude the government's retrying a defendant whose conviction
is set aside because of an error in the proceedings leading to con-
viction."'2 Historically, the United States Supreme Court justified
this relaxation of the double jeopardy clause on the fiction that by
appealing his case, the defendant waived double jeopardy protec-
tion.3 In Bryan v. United States', the Supreme Court extended
this rationale to permit a new trial upon a finding of insufficient
evidence because although the defendant had moved for a judg-
ment of acquittal, he had moved in the alternative for a new trial.
Succeeding cases generally turned on whether the defendant on
appeal moved for a new trial or for an acquittal.' However, in
Burks v. United States', the Supreme Court signaled a new ap-
proach, saying,
In our view it makes no difference that a defendant has sought
a new trial as one of his remedies, or even as the sole remedy.
It cannot be meaningfully said that a person "waives" his right
to a judgement of acquittal by moving for a new trial... Since
we hold today that the double jeopardy clause precludes a sec-
ond trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence le-
gally insufficient, the only "just" remedy available for that
court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.7
The United States Supreme Court has not, however, considered
the combination case which results when the trial court errone-
ously admits certain critical evidence', as in the recent West Vir-
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978).
2 United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 465 (1964).
3 See Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insuf-
ficient Evidence, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 365 (1964).
338 U.S. 552 (1950).
5 Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 (1960); Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957); Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955).
' 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
7 Id. at 17-18.
8 The United States Supreme Court specifically refused to consider this issue
in Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, n.9 (1978).
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ginia case, State v. Frazier.' A Logan county high school teacher,
Robert Frazier, was convicted of delivering marijuana to one of
his students."0 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals agreed
with the defendant that the trial court erred in admitting results
of a polygraph test" and non-expert testimony relating to a con-
trolled substance. 2 The state had relied on these two items of evi-
dence alone to prove an essential element of the crime, that the
substance was indeed marijuana.
Frazier contended that double jeopardy would attach to bar
retrial where insufficient evidence was the result of trial error. The
court, however, chose to ignore the hybrid nature of the case, and
after excluding some evidence as inadmissible, refused to review
the sufficiency of the remaining evidence.
Instead, the court carefully distinguished between "trial er-
ror" and "evidentiary insufficiency", and in so doing neatly lim-
ited its options. On a question of evidentiary insufficiency, the
court may either uphold the jury's verdict or enter a judgment of
acquittal. Where there is trial error, however, the case may be re-
manded for retrial. The impact of this approach is that even if
trial error results in evidentiary insufficiency, the defendant is not
entitled to a judgment of acquittal on appeal.
To support its refusal to review the sufficiency of the remain-
ing evidence, the court relied on Burks, and in particular on the
phrase "submitted to the jury". The court interpreted these words
to mean that the focus of a test for evidentiary insufficiency
should be on the entire body of evidence as it went to the jury."
However, another interpretation of these four words is possible.
Consider them in context:
252 S.E.2d 39 (W. Va. 1979).
10 W. VA. CODE §§ 60A-4-401(a)(1)(ii), 60A-2.204(d)(10)(1977 Replacement
Vol.).
" The defendant stipulated that the polygraph results could be used at trial.
The trial court admitted the results over the defense counsel's motion to strike the
evidence.
12 The state attempted to prove that the delivered substance was marijuana
through the testimony of a high school student.
(Also, Frazier assigned as error the fact that a state trooper, after testifying to
the Grand Jury, was permitted to remain in the grand jury room and assist the
prosecution in interrogating witnesses.
1' 252 S.E.2d at 53.
[Vol. 82
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[Wihen a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a
failure of proof at trial,. . the prosecution cannot complain of
prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer
whatever proof it could assemble. Moreover, such an appellate
reversal means that the government's case was so lacking that
it should not have even been submitted to the jury. Since we
necessarily afford absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquit-
tel - no matter how erroneous its decision - it is difficult to
conceive how society has any greater interest in retrying a de-
fendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that
the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty."
Would it not be an equally reasonable interpretation of the above
passage to say that it focused on the quality of the evidence as
well as the quantity? Should giving the prosecution "one fair op-
portunity to offer whatever proof it [can] assemble" mean that
the prosecution has the license to introduce a wide assortment of
evidence, perhaps ultimately inadmissible, knowing that if it is
indeed ruled inadmissible there will always be another chance?
The Frazier court further noted that the Burks central state-
ment on the double jeopardy clause emphasized "the initial fail-
ure of the prosecutor to muster evidence in the first proceeding. '"'5
The West Virginia court also interpreted this clause as mandating
as analysis of the weight of the evidence at the time the jury con-
sidered it.'6 Again, however, the question is nagging: should the
court look only at the weight of the evidence and completely ig-
nore its substance?
In addition to the Burks precedent, the Frazier court stressed
the unfairness to the prosection if the appellate court were to ap-
ply the "evidentiary insufficiency" test after excluding evidence
ruled inadmissible.17 The court justified giving the prosecution an-
other chance at conviction stating:
Here there were evidentiary points that involved matters
of first impression in this State. A reasonable prosecutor might
well have concluded that [the evidence] would be admit-
ted. . .When the new evidentiary rule is set adversely to his
position on appeal, he should not be foreclosed from developing
437 U.S. at 16.
, Id. at 11.
"252 S.E.2d at 53.
17 Id.-
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on a new trial alternate sources of proof.1
There are, however, several problems with this rationale.
First, the court did not examine whether it was reasonable for the
prosecutor to base the substance of his case primarily on evidence
which was, at best, of questionable admissibility." Further, even
assuming that a reasonable prosecutor would have thought the ev-
idence admissible, he would undoubtedly have some concern
about it. The question ultimately is whether prosecutorial innova-
tions should be tested at the expense of subjecting defendants to
the risk of a second trial.
The overriding concern should be whether the principles and
values behind the double jeopardy clause permit this emphasis on
the state's interest. The clause involves a balancing of conflicting
interests.
Undeniably the framers of the Bill of Rights were con-
28 Id.
" The reasonableness factor is particularly apt in the Frazier case. It should
come as no surprise that the West Virginia court followed the weight of authority
around the country and held polygraph tests to be inadmissible as evidence. Al-
though the West Virginia court had not really outlined a position before Frazier, it
had indicated that the tests were not favored. In Cannellas u. McKenzie, the court
declared that mere mention of a lie detector test should prompt a "reasonably
skillful trial counsel to move for a mistrial." 236 S.E.2d 327 (W. Va. 1977). Obvi-
ously, admitting lie detector tests would have involved a dramatic departure from
the court's previous philosophy.
Similarly, a "reasonable prosecutor," it seems, would have been reluctant to
rely on the testimony of a non-expert witness, particularly when that testimony
was being used to prove an essential element of the crime. The federal courts have
permitted lay testimony to prove that a certain substance is controlled, but the
testimony must be supported by other factors. For example, in United States u.
Gregorio, the court admitted:
an abundance of lay testimony from users.. .who had sampled the sub-
stance that its identity... was unmistakable. Furthermore, there was
other compelling circumstantial proof (secrecy and deviousness of trans-
actions, high prices paid in cash for these substances, lack of complaint
on the part of the purchasers, descriptive language of participants in
transactions and descriptions of the physical appearance of the
substance).
497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d
1219, 1223 (4th Cir. 1976), United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817, 828-29 (2d Cir.
1962), Toliver v. United States, 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955)
In Frazier, the state tried to prove that the substance was marijuana by intro-
ducing only the testimony of one high school student, with no supporting factors at
all.
[Vol. 82
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cerned to protect defendants from oppression and from efforts
to secure, through the callousness of repeated prosecutions,
convictions for whose justice no man could vouch. On the other
hand, they were also aware of the countervailing interest in the
vindication of criminal justice, which sets outer limits to the
protections for those accused of crimes.n
The question in Frazier centered on which interest must be
protected when evidentiary insufficiency arises as a result of trial
error. The court determined that the state's interests were con-
trolling, noting that "the considerations which permit a new trial
after reversal for error should control over the considerations
which should prohibit a new trial after reversal for insufficient
evidence."'"
The Frazier court emphasized -the unfairness if the prosecu-
tion were unable to rely on the trial court's rulings.n The problem
with this argument is that it endorses a second chance for the
prosecution, and "another opportunity to supply evidence it failed
to muster in the first proceeding. .." the very opportunity the
double jeopardy clause seeks to prohibit. Instead of automatically
assuming that the prosecution, relying on favorable evidentiary
rulings, didn't introduce other available evidence, the court could
raise a rebuttable presumption that the prosecution gave the 6ase
its best shot in the original trial.4 From a purely practical point of
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 218-19 (1957)(Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
21 Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insuffi-
cient Evidence, 31 U. Cm. L. Rav. 365, 372 (1964).
u In United States v. Mandel, the Federal Court, after ruling key evidence
inadmissible, posited this reliance as a policy argument in support of a decision to
give the prosecution another chance. United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1374
(4th Cir. 1979). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adopted this argu-
ment in Frazier.
21 437 U.S. at 11, cited in 252 S.E.2d at 50.
24 In United States v. Block, the Fourth Circuit noted:
The traditional justification for considering inadmissible as well as ad-
missible evidence in reviewing acquittal motions has been that the gov-
ernment may have foregone other available evidence in reliance upon
obviously stronger evidence admitted by the trial judge and only re-
vealed as inadmissible on appeal .... Burks of course did not deal with
a situation where this justification for a second chance of proof is as ap-
pealing. For in the situation where no misplaced reliance on proof admit-
ted on trial is revealed on appeal, the contrary assumption-that the
government has already had and given its best shot-is more reasonable.
1980]
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view, prosecutors should have no interest in retrying cases they
can't possibly win. If the evidence at the original trial was the
government's entire case, what could possibly be gained in a re-
trial? Thus, in addition to protecting defendants from double
jeopardy, permitting review of evidentiary sufficiency after ruling
some evidence inadmissible would save the state needless time
and expense.
In conclusion, the court should not ignore that the double
jeopardy clause attempts to balance society's interest and individ-
ual rights. The Frazier decision gave undue weight to the state's
interest. However, with proper analysis of the conflicting interests
the court could have struck a better balance. The court could
have developed a two-step process for review: First, an appellate
court, after declaring some evidence inadmissible, could review
the remaining evidence. Upon a finding of glaring insufficiency, it
could enter a judgment of acquittal.2 If it could not make that
determination, as a second step, it could remand the case to the
lower court. On remand, the lower court could examine the
residual evidence for evidentiary insufficiency before ordering a
retrial, considering a rebuttable presumption that the state had
presented its best case at the first trial. This solution would ulti-
mately serve the designs of the double jeopardy clause: to pre-
serve the state's interest in prosecution of criminals, while pro-
tecting the defendant from continued harassment by the judicial
system.
Lucinda Masterton
In this latter situation to permit retrial to perfect proof seems much
more likely merely to license the kind of harassment that double jeop-
ardy guards against.
590 F.2d 535, 544 n.12 (4th Cir. 1978).
21 There have been cases where the appellate court has reviewed the remain-
ing evidence for sufficiency. In United States v. Edmons, where the government's
case rested solely on identifications made as a result of illegal arrests, and there
was no suggestion that the government could produce any more evidence on re-
trial, the court directed that the indictments be dismissed. 432 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1970).
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